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The Impact of Rural Pensions in China on
Labor Migration
Karen Eggleston, Ang Sun, Zhaoguo Zhan
We study the impact of China’s new rural pension program on promoting migration of
labor by applying a regression discontinuity analysis to this new pension program. The
results reveal a perceptible difference in labor migration among adult children whose
parents are just above and below the age of pension eligibility: The adult children with a
parent just attaining the pension-eligible age are more likely to be labor migrants compared with those with a parent just below the pension-eligible age. We also ﬁnd that
with a pension-eligible parent, the adult children are more likely to have off-farm jobs.
These abrupt changes in household behavior at the cutoff suggest that these households
are credit constrained. In addition, we ﬁnd that the pension’s effect on migration is
greater among adult children with a parent in poor health; pension-eligible elderly report that they are more likely to use inpatient services when needed and less likely to
rely on adult children for care when they are ill. These results suggest that (expectations
regarding) providing care for elderly parents has constrained labor migration from
China’s rural areas to some extent, and that the new rural pension program has helped
to relax this constraint. JEL codes: H23; H31; H55; I38; J22; O15.
Keywords: China, employment, household formation, intergenerational transfers,
migration, off-farm, pension
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“While your parents are alive, do not journey afar.” — Confucius

The social costs of inadequate mobility of rural labor in the developing world,
despite the large wage gap between urban and rural areas, have attracted increasing awareness and scrutiny among researchers and policy makers. This issue is
especially salient in China, where city dwellers often earn more than three times
as much as farmers do (National Bureau of Statistics of China). At the same
time, as China’s population rapidly ages, the factory labor shortage (Yong Gong
Huang) highlighted in recent reports may intensify unless China ﬁnds ways to relax the constraints on full utilization of China’s vast albeit shrinking workingage population (Meng 2012). To facilitate economic development, it is critical to
understand the barriers that prevent people living in rural areas from migrating
to ﬁnd better jobs. In this paper, we use regression discontinuity analysis of the
novel pension program in rural China to estimate the effect of the “windfall” income on rural migration. Since households can anticipate pension receipt, our
ﬁndings of abrupt changes in labor migration and off-farm employment of adult
children with parent(s) become pension-eligible, suggest that credit constraints
are likely to be one factor preventing individuals from migrating in rural China.
This paper also contributes to our general knowledge about public pension
programs in developing countries. China’s rural pension system is only a few
years old and not well studied yet. In comparison, the old age pension system in
South Africa, which rapidly expanded in the early 1990s, has been extensively
scrutinized. The pensions in South Africa were very generous—twice the median
income per capita in rural areas and therefore were plausibly expected to play a
signiﬁcant role in household behaviors.1 By contrast, the new rural pension program in China provides an opportunity to examine the margins of household behavior when the pension payment is not as generous. The pension is about 10%
of the average income in Laiwu county, Shandong province, where our survey is
ﬁelded. Will such pension income have a perceptible impact on the well-being of
the elderly or impact household decision-making in observable ways? If so,
which household behaviors are most responsive? The answers to these questions
hold important policy implications as well as general lessons for household
theory.2

1. Researchers ﬁnd evidence consistent with the hypothesis that pension income also beneﬁts primeaged adults (promoting migration for some and support within the household for others) as well as the
pensioner’s grandchildren (Ardington, Case, and Hosegood 2009).
2. For example, there had been concern that the pension income may not substantially improve outcomes for pensioners because children would reduce their ﬁnancial support in lock step with the increase
in social support. Our results suggest that adult children do not signiﬁcantly reduce ﬁnancial transfers to
their elderly parents when the parents became pension-eligible. Instead, our ﬁndings suggest that the new
rural pension income beneﬁts multiple generations in the household, in the sense that pensioners report
better security and more labor migration among their adult children, a margin of occupational choice that
had been previously constrained.
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The pension program in Laiwu, launched in 2007, provides 55 RMB yuan per
month to every resident age 60 or older, with funds supplied by the central, provincial, and county governments. The age-based eligibility criterion of the pension program allows for a regression discontinuity design. To evaluate the effect
of the pension program, we draw on a detailed survey targeting rural elderly
near the pension-eligible age of 60.3 For each individual between 55 and 70 years
old, in addition to basic demographics and socioeconomic information, we asked
the respondent detailed questions about the attitudes and plans for support in
old age (anticipated sources of long-term care, living arrangements, etc.). We
also asked detailed questions about each of their children, including migration
history, occupational choices, and living arrangements, regardless of whether the
adult child was counted as a household member or was living under the same
roof with the respondent at the time of the survey (July 2012).
Comparing the households with an elderly parent just attaining the pension eligible age to households with an elderly parent just below the eligible age, our results reveal several signiﬁcant patterns. First, even though the pension represents
only 10% of average income and households could anticipate receipt, regression
discontinuity analysis reveals a perceptible difference in household behavior
around the age of pension eligibility, suggesting that these households are likely
to be credit constrained. In particular, our results show that after the older parent
receives a pension, the adult children are more likely to be a labor migrant and
take an off-farm job.4 Second, we ﬁnd that the pension’s effect on migration is
greater among adult children with a parent in poor health. These results are consistent with the previous ﬁndings that migration decisions of adult children are
inﬂuenced by the well-being of elderly parents.5 Third, we ﬁnd that pensioners
expect that they will be more likely to use hired services and slightly less likely to
rely on care from an adult child when ill. There is no change in self-assessed
health or health insurance coverage after the pension-eligible age threshold.
These results are consistent with the interpretation that the increase in income
relaxes the household credit constraint, making medical services more affordable
and enabling pensioners to substitute purchased services for instrumental support directly provided by the adult children. This substitution presumably provides the adult children with greater ﬂexibility to participate in the nation-wide
labor market.
In addition to exploiting the pension program to scrutinize the household
credit constraint, this paper has two key advantages over the prior research
3. Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu, Shandong, China.
The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research
Center, FSI, at Stanford University.
4. For clarity, we use “elderly” or “older parent” to refer to the older adults in our sample, age 55 to
70, to distinguish them from their adult children (typically in prime work ages of 20–40 and mostly parents themselves).
5. Giles and Mu (2007) ﬁnd a signiﬁcantly lower probability that a son will work as a migrant when
a parent is seriously ill.
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evaluating the impact of old-age pensions. The ﬁrst advantage lies in our data for
studying the effect of a ﬁnancial windfall on migration. Prior evidence suggests
living arrangements are endogenous and directly affected by a ﬁnancial windfall.
Therefore, the characteristics of household members in households receiving a
pension may be systematically different from those of nonpension households
(Klasen and Woolard 2000).6 Selective attrition will complicate identifying impacts if a household survey only includes the intact family or cannot track individuals who move away from the pensioner’s residence or those who migrate out
of the demographic surveillance area. For example, when estimating the effect of
pensions on adult labor supply in South Africa, researchers found opposite patterns when the sample only included residents (Bertrand et al. 2003) compared
to when the sample was extended to include nonresident household members
(Posel, Fairburn, and Lund 2004) within the demographic surveillance area.7 In
this paper, we ask the respondent detailed questions about each of their children,
regardless of whether the child is counted as a household member or is living under the same roof. Thus we generate data on the work, migration, and living arrangements of all adult children of pensioners and nonpensioners, without the
complication of sample attrition caused by endogenous household formation.
The second advantage of our study is the regression discontinuity design.
Life-cycle patterns and cohort heterogeneity profoundly shape the migration decisions of household members. Researchers examining the linkage between pension eligibility and migration have difﬁculty separating the effect of pension
income from that of age or cohort heterogeneity. In this paper, we apply regression discontinuity analysis to address this problem. Residents in Laiwu are eligible for rural pensions beginning at age 60 for both men and women, similar to
most other rural areas of China. A basic pension is available to all residents ﬁnanced by the collective fund, and individuals can purchase additional coverage
by choosing from a limited menu of options for contributory pensions. A regression discontinuity design has several advantages over other methods of identiﬁcation (Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller 2005) and has been applied to many
different settings (e.g., Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2009; Miller, Pinto, and
Vera-Hern
andez 2013).
We recognize that Laiwu is not nationally representative, but we believe this
study has methodological advantages and results that make it of broader interest.
In particular, the novelty of the survey enables us to shed light on
6. For example, the presence of a pension attracts household members who are signiﬁcantly less educated, more likely to be unemployed and to report being sick or injured (Ardington, Case, and Hosegood
2009). Moreover, there is evidence of a direct causal effect of pension income on household composition
through channels such as labor specialization within the extended household (Edmonds, Mammen, and
Millier 2005).
7. Ardington, Case, and Hosegood (2009) use panel data with individual ﬁxed effects to partially address the issue of different characteristics of individuals living with pensioners and those living without a
pensioner, but they admit that they cannot follow changes for individuals who exited the demographic
surveillance area between the waves of the survey because of migration.

Eggleston, Sun, Zhan

5

intrahousehold, intergenerational allocation when facing credit constraints. In
addition to our survey data, we also use the nationally representative China
Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) baseline data to test the
ﬁrst stage of our fuzzy regression discontinuity design: the impact of age eligibility on pension receipt. However, since CHARLS only has the information on
adult children who co reside with the elderly parents, replicating our results in a
nationally representative sample is not feasible.8
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the related
literature and setting of our study. Section 3 describes the data and our identiﬁcation strategy. Section 4 presents the main results and discusses interpretations.
Section 5 examines other outcomes to compare with prior research (e.g., on the
case of South Africa). Section 6 offers concluding remarks. Supplemental appendix S1 develops a conceptual framework about migration and contains other
supplementary results.
I. C R E D I T C O N S T R A I N T S

AND

PENSION

IN

RURAL CHINA

Low incomes and limited wealth, combined with incomplete credit markets,
make it difﬁcult for households to ﬁnance investments even when the returns exceed the costs, and constrain ability to smooth consumption. Certainly it is clear
that the rural elderly represent one of the lowest income groups in China, with
more than one in four falling below the poverty line. According to the CHARLS
baseline study in 2011–12, ﬁnancial support from children and other household
members plays a key role in reducing consumption poverty: the poverty rate
based only on the income of the rural elderly and their spouses (including pensions) is 65.1%, but falls to 28.9% when including intrahousehold transfers and
transfers from nonresident adult children, as well as public transfers and savings
(CHARLS Team 2013).
That lack of access to credit further contributes to constraining rural household’s choice sets is also evident, despite rapid improvement alongside economic
growth. Much prior research has found that Chinese rural households suffer
from a lack of access to credit (International Fund for Agricultural Development
2001; Luo 2004; Dong and Featherstone 2006; Yu 2008).
Rural credit markets in China can be separated into formal and informal markets. Formal credit is mostly used for the ﬁnancing of agricultural production
(Feder et al. 1990). The formal ﬁnancial institutions currently serving rural
China include the Agricultural Bank of China, Agricultural Development Bank
8. Moreover, China’s large regional diversity allows for testing theories of household behavior under
different circumstances regarding local social norms, labor market conditions, and generosity of the social
safety net. Thus localized information can provide insight, highlighting dimensions of heterogeneity that
may be less evident when the initial analyses aggregate to the national level. Indeed, the strong statistical
signiﬁcance of locality (such as indicator variables for county or province) has been noted by previous researchers on China’s economic demography (e.g., Smith et al. 2013).

6

THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW

of China, Rural Credit Cooperatives, and Rural Postal Savings. Formal ﬁnancial
institutions have strict requirements for rural loans and limited lending (Dong,
Lu, and Featherstone 2010).
Informal rural credit can take various forms. Interpersonal lending, which includes loans extended among friends, relatives, neighbors, or colleagues, is among
the most basic strategies that farmers use to deal with liquidity requirements. The
informal rural credit markets are highly segmented, with participants limited to
only those with personal relationships. Moreover, informal loans are small and
short-term. Other forms include lending from money lenders, pawnshops, and
private money houses, some of which are illegal (Tsai 2004). These forms require
collateral. In our sample, 40.23% of the elderly individuals report 0 savings, suggesting the limited availability of both formal and informal loans. Although
China’s overall savings rate is extraordinarily high, the older generation largely
missed the opportunity to invest and save except through investing in their children, especially sons who are expected to support them in their old age.
China is not unique in this regard. Throughout the developing world, having
children is a way to allocate household resources intertemporally. As Banerjee
and Duﬂo note in Poor Economics, “for many parents, children are their economic futures: an insurance policy, a savings product, and some lottery tickets,
all rolled into a convenient pint-size package” (118). Both theory and empirical
evidence suggest that households often allocate tasks among the extended family
members according to comparative advantage as shaped by social norms, with
some adult children providing ﬁnancial support to elderly parents while other
children mainly invest their time to assist with the parents’ daily activities and
provide care when parents are sick or in need of long-term care. In this case, the
credit constraint of the overall household can be relaxed by remittances from migrant children. However, small families cannot necessarily use such a strategy. In
our sample, 23.4% of the respondents only have one child. Moreover, social
norms still dictate that sons carry more responsibility to provide ﬁnancial and instrumental help to parents than daughters do, and over 50% of the respondents
we surveyed only have one son. China’s relatively low fertility, largely attributable to China’s family planning policies that began during the 1970s and are
only recently being relaxed, implies that for a great portion of households in rural China, including in our sample, it is not feasible to use the remittance of one
child to enable other children to migrate.
Recognizing that China’s demographic change was squeezing families and imperiling the traditional modes of elderly support—as well as the need for a social
protection system to undergird a “harmonious society” and help address burgeoning urban-rural disparities—China’s leadership introduced the New Rural
Pension System (NRPS). Beginning with 320 pilot counties, NRPS covered 838
counties by the end of 2010 and virtually all of rural China by the end of 2012.9
9. In 2009, the State Council of China released “the State Council Guidance Regarding the
Development of New Rural Pension Pilot” (China [2009] No. 32). Based on a number of pilot studies in
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The program represents a ﬁnancial “windfall” for the current elderly—those
who were already, or approaching, 60 years old when the program started. The
pension consists of three main parts: an individual premium (ge ren), a local government subsidy (ji ti), and a central government subsidy (zheng fu). For those
who voluntarily enroll, the individual premium comprises ﬁve categories: 100,
200, 300, 400, and 500 RMB per person per year, with correspondingly increasing beneﬁts that are also supposed to be adjusted according to the increase in
China’s per capita income. The local government subsidy is required to be no
less than 30 RMB per person per year. The central government subsidy, also
called the basic pension, starts at 55 RMB per month per person. Current elderly
receive the basic pension without ever having paid contributions.
Shandong Province implemented the national standard pension policies in virtually all respects. Laiwu County, located in central Shandong province, has income per capita close to the average for China as a whole. In sum, 60% of
Laiwu’s total population, and 70% of the residents above age 60, reside in
Laiwu’s rural areas. Laiwu began the pilot of NRPS in 2007. The pension provided 55 RMB yuan per month to every resident age 60 or older, with funds supplied by the central, provincial, and county governments. In 2012, this pension
was raised to 60 RMB yuan per month. Each district and village can offer additional pension options to their residents (such as contributory pensions on top of
the guaranteed state-ﬁnanced minimum), according to local conditions. In our
sample, 68.4% of the elderly received only the basic pension—60 RMB. For pension recipients, the pension payments constitute 60.2% of their total income, deﬁned as the sum of labor income and pension income.
Like most rural areas of China, Laiwu has limited options for institutional
care; most elderly reside in their own homes, with or without coresidence of (one
or more of) their adult children. Over the past several years, a few villages have
set up community care centers from village collective funds, providing no-rent
dormitory-like housing and cafeteria meals to all elderly village residents. These
changes overlap in time with the roll out of the pension scheme. In this article,
we focus on the effect of the pension ﬁnancial “windfall” rather than the community care centers’ impact on living arrangements, for two primary reasons. First,
institutionalized care, even in the modest form of these community care centers,
is not well accepted according to traditional social norms, especially in rural
China. In our sample, over 50% of the elderly believe living with children is the
most ideal arrangement. Second, most individuals in our sample, especially those
around the eligibility threshold of 60 years old, still work in the ﬁelds and do not
need institutional settings for long-term care.

selected rural areas, government ofﬁcials indicated that they expected the scheme to cover (i.e., be available for voluntary enrollment) 10% of rural regions by the end of 2009, 50% by 2012, and 100% by
2020. These expectations have been more than exceeded, at least in terms of coverage by the basic beneﬁt
program (not voluntary enrollment).
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II. D A T A

AND

FUZZY REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY
Data

This study compares the migration status of adult children who have a pensioneligible parent to the migration status of adult children whose parent(s) are
nearly eligible. Data for the study come from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu, Shandong, China. Our survey is among the most recent and detailed available for studying the impact of the new rural pension system on
household decisions. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University,
China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
We ﬁrst categorize all villages into three strati according to GDP per capita in
2010. In the ﬁrst stage, within each stratus, four villages and one community
care center are randomly selected and the village heads are interviewed to assess
basic village characteristics and the implementation of the pension program.10
Village heads also provide a residents’ roster with basic demographic information of each individual. In the second stage, from each village or community care
center a random sample of residents who fall in the age range from 55 to 70 are
interviewed with detailed questions about household composition, living arrangements, work-related migration of adult children, and the health and health
care utilization of the elderly. In particular, the correspondents report the demographic information and work-related migration for each of their children above
ag 16. Our stratiﬁed random sample of 12 villages and three community care
centers in rural Laiwu includes data on 676 older adults with 1,441 children and
1,553 grandchildren.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the outcome measures used in this
study. Panels A and B report the outcomes for adult children and elderly parents,
respectively. The ﬁrst column reports the mean and standard deviations for the
full sample, that is, households with respondents age 55 to 70. Columns (2) and
(3) report means and standard deviations when conﬁning the sample to households with a member between ages 55 and 65—5 years around the age cutoff.
Column (4) reports the result of a t -test comparing the difference between the
mean of those below and above the pension eligibility threshold. Note that these
descriptive statistics could be different from the true causal effect of pension receipt because the means and t -tests capture not only the pension effect, but also
any trends regarding aging and cohort heterogeneity. The potential difference
underscores the importance of using a rigorous study design such as regression
discontinuity to distinguish the effect of pension income from the life cycle pattern of extended household formation and other outcomes.

10. We over-sampled elderly living in these dormitory-style community care centers (“yanglao yuan,”
rarely providing comprehensive nursing services). According to the 2005 National Aged Population
Survey only 1.2% of China’s rural elderly lived in a nursing home (Chen, Eggleston, and Li 2012).
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T A B L E 1. Sample Summary Statistics of the Main Outcome Variables
Dependent variable

Panel A. Adult Children
N
Migrant laborer (1¼Yes, 0¼No)
Off-farm job (1¼Yes, 0¼No)
Co-reside with elderly parents (1¼Yes, 0¼No)
Panel B. Elderly Parents
N
Expect to be admitted to hospital when
recommended (1¼ Yes, 0¼No)
Expect to use family care when ill
(1¼Yes, 0¼No)

[55,70]

[55,60)

[60,65]

Diff (3)-(2)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

1,441
0.192
(0.394)
0.560
(0.497)
0.060
(0.238)

396
0.260
(0.439)
0.659
(0.475)
0.141
(0.349)

355
0.200
(0.401)
0.634
(0.482)
0.031
(0.174)

0.060*
(0.031)
0.025
(0.035)
0.110***
(0.020)

676
0.893
(0.309)
0.700
(0.459)

254
0.925
(0.264)
0.642
(0.480)

172
0.924
(0.265)
0.686
(0.465)

0.001
(0.026)
0.044
(0.047)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu,
Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and the
Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: Panel A reports the summary statistics of the main outcome variables of adult children of
the survey respondents; panel B reports the summary statistics of the main outcome variables for
the elderly respondents. Column (1) reports the mean and standard deviation (in parentheses) for
all respondents. In column (2) and (3), we conﬁne the sample to respondents who fall in the age
range of [55, 60) and [60, 65], respectively. The entries in column (4) are the mean and standard errors when conducting the t-test comparing the mean in (2) and (3). ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity
Our empirical approach is driven by the age discontinuity in the beneﬁt structure
of the social pension program. Among the elderly in Laiwu, Shandong, social
pension eligibility depends almost exclusively on age—one becomes eligible for
the pension at age 60. Thus pension income does not depend on cumulative
work history or the circumstances of the extended family.
To identify the effect of the pension program, we adopt the nonparametric
Fuzzy Regression Discontinuity (FRD) design. This design allows the jump in the
probability of assignment to the treatment at the threshold to be less than 1 (as
indicated by ﬁgure 1). In our survey, we collect information on the implementation of the pension program at the village level. We found pension receipt is
largely determined by age eligibility and the deviations are mostly driven by the
variation in implementation at the village level. Wealthier villages grant pensions
earlier, whereas in the poorest village in our sample, only 35% of the eligible elderly received pension income.
The validity of the regression discontinuity design crucially depends on the
continuity of the running variable, that is, age measured in days in our FRD design. In this paper, we adopt McCrary’s (2008) density test to formally examine
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F I G U R E 1. Pension Receipt According to Normalized Age (0 ¼ eligibility
threshold, age 60)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in
Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong
University, China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford
University.
Note: This ﬁgure uses the sample of the respondents in the age range of (55, 65).
The pension eligible age is 60. This ﬁgure shows the relationship between the relative age (horizontal axis) and pension receipt (vertical axis). The dots show the
sample mean of the indicator variable for receiving a pension (1 if receiving pension, 0 otherwise) in each quarter of (55, 65), that is, by three-month increments
of age. The line represents the linear regression of the dummy indicator of receiving pension income on the relative age. The thin, curves show the 90% conﬁdence interval.

whether the density of age is continuous at the cutoff point 60. The outcome of
this test is presented in supplemental appendix ﬁgure S3.1 (available at http://
wber.oxfordjournals.org/), and the null of continuity is not rejected. Graphically,
supplemental appendix ﬁgure S3.1 shows that there is no immediate jump after
age 60, so manipulation of age in order to be eligible for a pension is unlikely to
exist in our study.
In this design, the ratio of the jump in the regression of the outcome (denoted
by yi in (1)) on age to the jump in the regression of the treatment indicator
(denoted by pensioni in (1)) on age is interpreted as an average causal effect of
the treatment (Imbens and Lemieux 2008). Formally, the estimand is

Eggleston, Sun, Zhan

sFRD ¼

lima#60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ  lima"60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ
lima#60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ  lima"60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ

11

(1)

The identiﬁcation assumption is that the individuals near pension eligibility
(i.e., in their late 50s) and those who just became eligible (in their early 60s) are
comparable except for pension eligibility. Speciﬁcally, two conditions must hold.
First, the outcome for an individual depends on resources and characteristics of
the household and all of its potential members, and these (unobserved) characteristics must have “continuous” effects on the outcome variables. Second, the characteristics of the household and all its potential members should have continuous
distributions around the age threshold. We provide suggestive evidence to show
that the unobservable respondents’ characteristics are likely balanced within a
small neighborhood around the age threshold to the extent that the observable
predetermined covariates do not show any signiﬁcant jump at the threshold.
Such graphical evidence is shown in supplemental appendix ﬁgure S3.2.
We use local linear regression to calculate lima#60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ , lima"60
Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ , lima#60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ and lima"60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ,
respectively. For the implementation of local linear regression, we choose
the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008) 11
and use the rectangular kernel.
For each main outcome variable yi , we conduct RD estimation with local linear
regression described above. Both the reduced form estimand lima#60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ
lima"60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ and the FRD estimand are reported, together with the
bandwidth values.
To interpret our result, we need to impose the assumption of monotonicity,
that is, older individuals are more likely to receive a pension than younger ones.
Speciﬁcally, the effect of interest is how pension income impacts subsequent
household outcomes for “compliers,” deﬁned as individuals who do not receive
a pension if not eligible (below age 60) and do receive a pension if eligible (age
60 or older). Then,
sFRD ¼

lima#60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ  lima"60 Eðyi jagei ¼ aÞ
lima#60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ  lima"60 Eðpensioni jagei ¼ aÞ

(2)

¼ Eðyi ð1Þ  yi ð0Þjindividual i is a complier and agei ¼ aÞ

where yi ð1Þ denotes the outcome when the respondent i is “treated” by the pension program (pension receipt ¼ 1) and yi ð0Þ denotes the outcome when the
respondent is “not treated” by the pension program (pension receipt ¼ 0).
In addition, we interpret Eðyi ð1Þ  yi ð0Þjindividual i is a complier and agei ¼ aÞ
as the lower bound of the pension program’s average effect at the threshold age a

11. The optimal bandwidth is chosen by the criteria of minimizing squared bias and variance.
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for the compliers because more households will respond to the income windfall
given a longer period of time.
To check the sensitivity of the reduced-form nonparametric estimation, we
also employ an alternative parametric method using all observations, by modeling the outcome yi as
yi ¼ a þ s  1ðagei  60Þ þ b  f ðagei  60Þ þ d  1ðagei  60Þf ðagei  60Þ þ i (3)

where f ðagei  60Þ is a polynomial function of the normalized age, agei  60.12
To test the robustness of the nonparametric FRD estimands, we employ the 2SLS
estimator s in (4), using Zi ¼ 1ðagei  60Þ as the IV for pensioni
yi ¼ a þ s  pensioni þ b  f ðagei  60Þ þ d  1ðagei  60Þf ðagei  60Þ þ i

(4)

Both the reduced-form estimand s in equation (3) and the IV estimand s from
(4) are reported.
Standard errors of estimates reported in the paper are clustered at the village
level.13 More detailed discussion on clustered standard errors is contained in the
supplemental appendix S3.2.
During the survey, we asked the respondents about the main outcomes prior
to the survey, when the pension program was not yet launched. As a placebo
test, we redo the reduced form estimations using this preprogram information
and show no effect prior to the pension policy.
III. R E S U L T S

AND

INTERPRETATIONS

The First Stage: Pension Receipt
Figure 1 plots the probability that a respondent reports receiving a social pension, according to the respondent’s normalized age (¼0 if age is 60). The 20 dots
on each side of the cutoff are the 3-month average of the dummy indicator of receiving a pension. In addition, the ﬁgure shows the regression line and the 90%
conﬁdence interval, where y is the dummy indictor of receiving pension (1 if receiving pension, 0 otherwise). We see a sharp jump of the ﬁtted value of pension
receipt at the age cutoff of 60. Figure 1 shows a strong ﬁrst stage of our FRD
estimation.

12. We report the outcome of OLS and IV based on second order polynomials for consistency, since
quantitative criteria suggest various choices of the order, and produce qualitatively similar results for most
of outcome variables we study.
13. They are computed by the routine STATA cluster option. Alternatively (as suggested by one
referee), we also consider the [moulton 1986 random] correction for standard errors, which is reported in
supplemental appendix (table S3.2–S3.7).
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Table 2 reports the result of RD estimation. In panel A, when using our Laiwu
county data, the two estimation methods yield very similar results: at the eligibility cutoff point, approximately 59.4% of the elderly receive pension payments.
This jump is highly signiﬁcant. To conﬁrm that our Laiwu data are not misleadingly different from the national situation in rural China, we show in panel B
that using the nationally representative CHARLS data yield smaller but equally
signiﬁcant OLS and RD estimands.
To have a better understanding of the ﬁrst stage, we also examine the discontinuity of living in community care centers at the eligible age cutoff because together with the pension program, some villages in Laiwu County also provide
subsidized community care centers. Supplemental appendix ﬁgure S3.3 does not
reveal a signiﬁcant jump of the propensity of living in institutions at the pensioneligible age. Neither nonparametric nor parametric RD regression shows a significant change at the age cutoff. Therefore, in this paper we focus on the income
effect of the pension program.
Migration and Occupation of Adult Children
In our survey, we asked the respondent about whether each adult child was a migrant worker. If not, we asked the timing of her last work-related migration if
she migrated before. We also solicited information about each adult child’s current job, her last job, and the timing of the last change of jobs. Therefore, we can
examine migration status and off-farm employment in 2012 (after the pension
program was fully in effect) as the main results and compare to results in 2006
(one year before pensions were introduced) as a placebo test.14
Figure 2 plots ﬁtted values from a linear regression of the dummy indicator
for work-related migration on relative age, as well as the 90% conﬁdence band.
Figure 2 panel A for treatment in 2012 shows the jump of the dummy indicator
for adult children migrating for work at the age when the elderly parent becomes
pension-eligible. By contrast, we do not see the same pattern in panel B using the
migration information one year before implementation of the pension program.
Table 3 panel A reports the RD estimands using the sample composed of all
adult children of the respondents. Columns (2) and (3) show the nonparametric
RD and FRD estimands using local linear regressions in the postprogram period
are statistically signiﬁcant at the 5% level. Columns (4) and (5) show that the
RD and FRD estimands from ﬁtting OLS regressions with second-order control
functions yield similar results. The coefﬁcients of pension eligibility are signiﬁcant at the 10% level. The magnitudes of the nonparametric FRD and 2SLS estimands are 31.1 and 25.4 percentage points, respectively. The large magnitude
could be in part because of our small sample size, which leads to large conﬁdence
intervals but also because the pension, although modest, constitutes a substantial
increase in the income of the elderly. In our sample, most elderly rely upon
14. Most of the adult children only changed jobs once during the period between 2006 and 2012.
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T A B L E 2. First Stage: RD Estimands of Pension Receipt
Dependent variable

N

Local linear regression
(1)

Panel A. Laiwu Survey
Indicator of Pension Receipt
(1¼Yes; 0¼No)
Bandwidth
Panel B. CHARLS Sample
Indicator of Pension Receipt
(1¼Yes; 0¼No)
Bandwidth

(2)

OLS with 2nd-order polynomial
(3)

670

0.594***
(0.080)
7.508

0.589***
(0.084)

3,671

0.252***
(0.036)
4.180

0.444***
(0.032)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu,
Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and the
Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: Panel A uses the data from our Laiwu Survey and panel B uses the China Health and
Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) sample. In each panel, column (1) is the number of observations; column (2) reports the nonparametric RD estimand. We use local linear regression with
the uniform kernel and choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux
(2008); the results in column (3) report the parametric RD estimand with 2nd-order polynomials of
the running variables, using all observations. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%.
*Signiﬁcant at 10%.

support from their adult children. For pension recipients, the pension payments
constitute 60.2% of their total income, deﬁned as the sum of labor income and
pension income.
In table 3 columns (6) and (7), we report the nonparametric and parametric
reduced-form RD estimands using migration status in the placebo year and do
not ﬁnd any discrete change at the age cutoff, which lends credibility to the linkage between the discrete change and pension receipt in our benchmark analysis.
We run similar analyses for the dummy indicator of off-farm employment of
adult children. Figure 3 panel A shows a slight insigniﬁcant increase in the likelihood of off-farm employment, when bandwidth is 5 years of age. Table 4 panel
A column (3) shows that the FRD estimand on the likelihood of off-farm employment increases signiﬁcantly at the margin of pension eligibility when bandwidth
is conﬁned to around 3.57 years of age. Figure 3 panel B and table 4 panel A columns (6) and (7) show that the increase in off-farm employment disappears
when examining the placebo before-pension period. It is worthy to note that
without the pension program, the signs of the RD estimands are negative, which
is consistent with lower off-farm employment among older cohorts.
We study heterogeneity in the pension effect to shed light on the mechanism(s)
through which pension income affected household decisions. As discussed in section 2, similar to other countries in the developing world, elderly residents in rural China suffer a high risk of poverty and lack social safety net. In this
circumstance, instrumental help from adult children is essential. In particular,
family care provided by adult children is most common when an elderly family
member falls ill. In the supplemental appendix S1, we sketch a simple model to
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F I G U R E 2. Work-related Migration Status of Adult Children, for Treatment
(2012) and Placebo (2006) Years
Panel A. Treatment 2012 Panel B. Placebo 2006

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in
Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University,
China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: This ﬁgure uses the sample composed of the adult children of respondents in
the age range of (55, 65). The pension eligible age is 60. This ﬁgure shows the relationship between the elderly parent’s relative age and work-related migration of
adult children. The dots show the sample mean of the dummy indicator for workrelated migration (1 if migrate for work, 0 otherwise) in each quarter of (55, 65).
The line represents the linear regression of the dummy indicator of work-related
migration on the relative age. The thin, curves show the 90% conﬁdence interval.
Panel A shows the result for the treatment year 2012, while panel B shows a placebo test of the same relationship in the year 2006 prior to the ﬁrst implementation of the pension program in Laiwu.

(3)

FRD

Reduced
form RD
(4)
(5)

FRD

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial

0.020
(0.041)
11.765

Reduced
form RD
(6)

Local linear
regression

0.001
(0.039)

Reduced
form RD
(7)

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial

Before implementation (2006)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong
University, China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: Panel A uses the data from the whole Laiwu sample; panel B uses the sample conﬁned to adult children with a parent in fair or poor health; and
panel C uses the sample conﬁned to adult children with a parent in good or excellent health. In each panel, column (1) is the number of observations; using
the nonparametric method, column (2) and column (3) report the reduced form RD estimands and the FRD estimands, respectively. We use local linear regression with the uniform kernel and choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As robustness checks, for both columns
(4) and (5), we use all observations to ﬁt an OLS regression with 2nd-order polynomials on both sides of the age cutoff. In column (4), the coefﬁcient of the
dummy indicator of age eligibility is interpreted as the reduced form RD estimand, and in column (5) the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of pension receipt
instrumented by age eligibility is interpreted as the FRD estimand. Column (6) and column (7) report the reduced form RD estimand using nonparametric
and parametric methods, respectively, as a placebo test using the data one year prior to the implementation of the pension program. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%.
**Signiﬁcant at 5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

0.154**
0.311**
0.138*
0.254*
(0.074)
(0.147)
(0.073)
(0.139)
Bandwidth
3.800
3.827
Divide the sample by elderly parents’ health Panel B. Adult children with a parent in fair or poor health
885
0.193**
0.383**
0.175*
0.353*
(0.084)
(0.166)
(0.086)
(0.199)
Bandwidth
4.790
4.818
Panel C. Adult children with a parent in good health
556
0.099
0.208
0.113*
0.173**
(0.099)
(0.193)
(0.058)
(0.077)
Bandwidth
3.362
3.391

Panel A. All adult children of the respondents
1,441

(1)

Reduced
form RD
(2)

Migrant laborer51; 0 otherwise

N

Local linear
regression

Dependent variable

After implementation (2012)

T A B L E 3. RD Estimation on Labor Migration for Adult Children
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F I G U R E 3. Off-farm Employment Status of Adult Children, for Treatment
(2012) and Placebo (2006) Years
Panel A. Treatment 2012 Panel B. Placebo 2006

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in
Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University,
China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: This ﬁgure uses the sample composed of the adult children of respondents in
the age range of (55, 65). The pension eligible age is 60. This ﬁgure shows the relationship between the elderly parent’s relative age and off-farm employment
of adult children. The dots show the sample mean of the dummy indicator for
off-farm employment (1 if employed off-farm, 0 otherwise) in each quarter of
(55, 65). The line represents the linear regression of the dummy indicator of offfarm employment on the relative age. The thin, curves show the 90% conﬁdence
interval. Panel A shows the result for the treatment year 2012, while panel B
shows a placebo test of the same relationship in the year 2006 prior to the ﬁrst implementation of the pension program in Laiwu.

1,441

N
(1)

0.118
(0.075)
3.564

Reduced Form RD
(2)

Local linear
regression

0.287***
(0.085)

0.106
(0.138)

0.081
(0.219)
3.656

0.200**
(0.069)

Reduced Form RD
(4)

0.374**
(0.190)
4.201

0.231*
(0.137)
3.570

FRD
(3)

0.128
(0.193)

0.621***
(0.198)

0.365***
(0.116)

FRD
(5)

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial

0.094
(0.188)
2.597

Reduced Form RD
(6)

Local Linear
Regression

0.069
(0.103)

Reduced Form RD
(7)

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial

Before implementation (2006)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong
University, China and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: Panel A uses the data from the whole Laiwu sample; panel B uses the sample conﬁned to adult children with a parent in fair or poor health; and
panel C uses the sample conﬁned to adult children with a parent in good or excellent health. In each panel, column (1) is the number of observations; using
the nonparametric method, column (2) and column (3) report the reduced form RD estimands and the FRD estimands, respectively. We use local linear regression with the uniform kernel and choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As robustness checks, for both columns
(4) and (5), we use all observations to ﬁt an OLS regression with 2nd-order polynomial control functions on both sides of the age cutoff. In column (4), the
coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of age eligibility is interpreted as the reduced form RD estimand, and in column (5) the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator
of pension receipt instrumented by age eligibility is interpreted as the FRD estimand. Column (6) and column (7) report the reduced form RD estimand using
nonparametric and parametric methods, respectively, as a placebo test using the data one year prior to the implementation of the pension program.
***Signiﬁcant at 1%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

Bandwidth
Divide the sample by elderly parents’ health
Panel B. Adult children with a parent in fair or poor health
885
0.155
(0.108)
Bandwidth
4.225
Panel C. Adult children with a parent in good health
556
0.071
(0.131)
Bandwidth
3.607

Panel A. Whole Sample

Off-farm job51; 0 otherwise

Dependent variable

After implementation (2012)

T A B L E 4. RD Estimation on Off-farm Employment for Adult Children
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illustrate how the commitment of adult children to invest their time in instrumental support of their elderly parent constrains them from migration to improve
their earnings in the next period. This framework implies that adult children
with parent(s) in poor health are more constrained from migrating than those
with parent(s) in better health. (Of course, a parent’s health status is far from
random; for example, richer households are both more likely to have healthy
parents and be free from credit constraints.15) This framework is also consistent
with Giles and Mu’s (2007) empirical ﬁndings of a signiﬁcantly lower probability
that a Chinese son will work as a migrant when a parent is seriously ill.
In this setting, pension income makes medical services more affordable, therefore, enables pensioners to substitute purchased services for instrumental support
directly provided by the adult children. This substitution presumably provides
the adult children with greater ﬂexibility in participation in the nation-wide labor
market. Such ﬂexibility matters more for the most constrained households, that
is, the households with a parent in poor health. This heterogeneity could also reﬂect the lack of a complete insurance market because respondents in poor health
could face higher interest rates for a loan and/or caring for an elder in poor
health is likely to lower households’ overall income.
We categorize the sample by respondents’ self-reported health status. We ﬁnd
that the RD estimands for migration and off-farm employment are consistently
of larger magnitude for those adult children whose parent(s) report fair or poor
health (in panel B of table 3 and table 4), compared to the estimands using the
whole sample (in panel A of table 3 and table 4) or the estimands using the sample composed of households with a parent in good health (in panel C of table 3
and table 4).16 Conducting RD estimation using an even smaller sample could
limit precision of the estimation, which may partly explain the larger magnitude
and conﬁdence intervals of the RD estimands, but comparison between the results in panels B and C (both with smaller subsamples) clearly illustrates that the
households with a parent in fair or poor health are mostly affected by the pension program.
As a robustness check, we run a placebo test of the RD analysis to investigate
the indicator of pension receipt and the potentially interesting outcomes at the
placebo “assumed age cutoff” of 58. Under our premise of credit constraint,
household behavior should not change at age 58 because the “windfall” has not
yet been received. As shown in the supplemental appendix table S3.1, none of
the RD coefﬁcients are statistically signiﬁcant, consistent with our premise.

15. If the elderly respondents’ health reﬂects the extent to which a household is credit constrained, it
is still interesting to document the heterogeneity of the pension effect.
16. For the subsample composed of households with a parent in good health, the magnitude of the
jump for both results are of much smaller magnitude, indicating the statistical insigniﬁcance is unlikely to
be caused by smaller sample size.
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Respondents’ Expectations on the Form of Care They Will Receive When Ill
If adult children are constrained from leaving their parents because purchasing
substitute instrumental support is unaffordable and if such a constraint is relaxed
by pension income, then we should be able to observe the substitution of hired
services for instrumental support from adult children, especially in household
plans for intensive care of ill parents.
To test this prediction, we examine respondents’ expectations regarding the
kind of care that they expect to receive if they become ill. We ask the respondents
“If you get ill, will your adult children provide you care?” We draw upon the
question “If you get ill and are recommended by a doctor to be hospitalized, will
you stay in hospital?” to shed light on whether more income boosts the respondents’ expectations of access to nonfamilial care when ill.17
Consistent with this hypothesis, we ﬁnd that elderly parents have lower expectations of receiving care provided by children, as shown in table 5 panel A, although the nonparametric estimand for expectation of receiving care from adult
children is not signiﬁcant when bandwidth is four years of age. The OLS estimation with second-order polynomials yields signiﬁcant negative RD estimand upon
the pension eligible age. The insigniﬁcant nonparametric estimand could be consistent with the roughness of our survey indicator and China’s tradition of ﬁlial piety.
Children are regarded as responsible to provide care to parents when sick, and depending on the severity of illness, adult children are almost inevitably involved in
some form of family care. Thus, the indicator may not be able to capture the
change in expected intensity of involvement of adult children in future family care.
In addition, table 5 panel A demonstrates that after they become pensioneligible, respondents report being more likely to use inpatient services when recommended by a doctor. The results are consistently signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
We address the skepticism that such increase could be caused by more affordable
medical services or worsening of health. Rural residents of all ages are covered
by the subsidized New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) health insurance.
There is no evidence in our data of different coverage between residents below
and above age 60. Table 5 panel B shows no discrete change in NCMS enrollment at age 60 in either the nonparametric or OLS regression. In addition, we
examine the health status of individuals and ﬁnd no discontinuity of the selfreported health status at age 60, suggesting that the abrupt change in expectation
of using inpatient services is unlikely to be attributable to sudden worsening of
health. The magnitudes of the RD coefﬁcients in panel B are very small, indicating that the chance of a discrete change in these variables is very low.

17. Although inpatient medical care (e.g., for a surgical procedure) is different from in-home care by
children when sick (e.g., cooking, preparing an herbal remedy, feeding, bathing), at least in rural China
there are reasons to suspect a degree of substitutability. Even in high-income Japan, there is a large controversy about “social hospitalization” for elderly with long-term care needs, as manifest by hospital lengths
of stay far exceeding most other OECD countries.
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T A B L E 5. Expectation on Services Will Receive When Ill by Elderly Parents
Dependent Variable

Local linear
regression
N
(1)

Reduced
form RD
(2)

Panel A. Suggestive evidence on consumption
Expect when ill to receive family
676 0.066
care provided by adult children
(0.082)
(1¼Yes, 0¼No)
Bandwidth
3.993
Expect to use inpatient services
676 0.130**
when recommended (1¼Yes,
(0.059)
0¼No)
Bandwidth
3.696

FRD

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial
FRD

(3)

Reduced
form RD
(4)

0.125
(0.143)

0.193**
(0.076)

0.321***
(0.107)

3.978
0.232**
(0.107)

0.173**
(0.077)

0.277**
(0.123)

(5)

3.682

Panel B. Test continuity of health and take-up rate of social health insurance
676
0.013
0.009
NCMS enrollment (China’s subsi(0.019)
(0.019)
dized health insurance for rural
residents)(1¼Yes, 0¼No)
Bandwidth
4.980
Self-reported health status (1-5)
676 0.002
0.035
(0.100)
(0.112)
Bandwidth
6.438
Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu,
Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and the
Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: The results use the data of correspondents in the Laiwu Survey. In panel A, column (1) is
the number of observations; using the nonparametric method, column (2) and column (3) report the
reduced form RD estimands and the FRD estimands, respectively. We use local linear regression
with the uniform kernel and choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and
Lemieux (2008). As robustness checks, for both columns (4) and (5), we use all observations to ﬁt
an OLS regression with 2nd-order polynomials on both sides of the age cutoff. In column (4), the
coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of age eligibility is interpreted as the reduced form RD estimand,
and in column (5) the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of pension receipt instrumented by age eligibility is interpreted as the FRD estimand. In panel B, we check the continuity of respondents’ selfreported health and the dummy indicator of taking up the New Cooperative Medical System, which
is the subsidized voluntary health insurance program for rural residents in China. Columns (2) and
(4) report the RD estimands using nonparametric and parametric methods, respectively.
***Signiﬁcant at 1%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

IV. O T H E R O U T C O M E S
In addition to labor migration, the effect of pensions on other outcomes, such as
intergenerational transfers and living arrangements, are of economic interest and
have been studied in prior research on South Africa’s pension program
(Ardington, Case, and Hosegood 2009; Duﬂo 2003; Edmonds, Mammen, and
Miller 2005). To compare the pension program in rural China with that in South
Africa, we provide supplementary results on how these outcomes respond to pension receipt in our Laiwu data.
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Living Arrangements
The migration of adult children could directly lead to a change in living arrangements, with the adult children moving away from their natal home either temporarily or permanently. However, labor-related migration of adult children does
not necessarily result in a signiﬁcantly smaller family size or lower likelihood of
the pensioners living together with their adult children because the low proportion of initial coresidence may have been too small to detect much impact on that
margin and because of competing forces changing other margins of living arrangements upon pension receipt. For example, Edmonds, Mammen, and Miller
(2005) ﬁnd that prime working age women depart, but the presence of children
under ﬁve and young women of child-bearing age increases. They interpret the
ﬁnding as suggestive evidence about a setting where prime age women have a
comparative advantage in work away from extended family relative to younger
women. This subsection studies the setting of rural China to explore the effect of
the pension program on extended family living arrangements.
In rural China, extended families have traditionally been composed of parents,
their unmarried children, and one or more married sons with wives and children,
while daughters leave their natal family behind and become part of their husbands’ families at the time of marriage (Lang 1946). For extended families with
multiple adult sons, one or more married sons usually move away from the parents’ house to live independently. Economic factors are major forces in determining when adult children leave their parents’ house (Cohen 1992). Therefore, to
investigate the potential effect of pension receipt on family living rearrangements,
we conﬁne the sample to adult sons and focus on the outcome of coresidence
with elderly parents.
Table 6 reports the results regarding living arrangements. Panel A uses the
sample of adult sons. In the postprogram period, for adult sons, although there
is no signiﬁcant effect on coresidence, the coefﬁcients in column (2)–(5) are consistently negative. The insigniﬁcant estimands could partially be because the portion of coresidence in our sample is low on average and therefore not very
responsive to migration. In table 6 columns (6) and (7), we document the living
arrangements of adult children in the placebo year 2006.18 Without the implementation of pension program, the RD coefﬁcient on coresidence is not signiﬁcant. Moreover, the RD coefﬁcients are positive, indicating the average
likelihood of coresidence is greater among the older cohorts. This is consistent
with the declining time trend of coresidence across generations in rural China
(Peng 2011).
18. In our survey, we asked the respondents “in what year did the current living arrangement start?”
and “with whom did you live before this change?” For the latter question, the respondents choose from
among “living alone,” “living with spouse,” “living with (other) children,” “living with (other) relatives,”
and “living in a nursing home.” The respondents are also asked to provide the demographic information
of current household members, from which we construct the variables describing current living
arrangements.

N Reduced form RD
(1)
(2)

FRD
(3)

Local linear regression

0.084
(0.132)

0.148
(0.154)

0.126
(0.162)

0.098
(0.100)

0.093
(0.117)

FRD
(5)

0.063
(0.094)

Reduced form RD
(4)

OLS with 2nd-order polynomial

0.299
(0.251)
6.852

0.164
(0.154)
7.760

Reduced form RD
(6)

0.042
(0.068)

0.179
(0.146)

Reduced form RD
(7)

Local linear regression OLS with 2nd-order polynomial

Before implementation (2006)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu, Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong
University, China, and the Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: Panel A uses the data of adult children from the Laiwu Sample; panel B uses the sample of grandchildren from the sons’ families; and panel C uses
the sample of elderly parents with at least one adult son. In each panel, column (1) is the number of observations; using the nonparametric method, column
(2) and column (3) report the reduced form RD estimands and the FRD estimands, respectively. We use local linear regression with the uniform kernel and
choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As robustness checks, for both columns (4) and (5), we use all observations
to ﬁt an OLS regression with 2nd-order polynomial control functions on both sides of the age cutoff. In column (4), the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of
age eligibility is interpreted as the reduced form RD estimand, and in column (5) the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of pension receipt instrumented by
age eligibility is interpreted as the FRD estimand. Column (6) and column (7) report the reduced form RD estimand using nonparametric and parametric
methods, respectively, as a placebo test using the data one year prior to the implementation of the pension program. ***Signiﬁcant at 1%. **Signiﬁcant at
5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

Panel A. Sample of adult sons
Co-reside with the respondent 768
0.058
0.088
(1¼Yes, 0¼No)
(0.088)
(0.148)
Bandwidth
4.551
4.542
Panel B. Sample of the grandchildren from the sons’ families
Co-reside with the respondent 849
0.114
0.168
(1¼Yes, 0¼No)
(0.090)
(0.166)
Bandwidth
4.351
4.333
Panel C. Sample of the elderly parents with adult sons
Numbers of co-residing adult 533
0.123
0.206
sons
(0.108)
(0.185)
Bandwidth
5.680
5.675

Dependent variable

After implementation (2012)

T A B L E 6. RD Estimation on Living Arrangements
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We examine the outcome of coresidence with respondents using the sample of
grandchildren from adult sons’ families. The results are shown in table 6 panel B.
The coefﬁcients of pension eligibility in columns (2)–(5) are consistently negative
but not signiﬁcant. The results show no evidence of family division or respondents bringing in grandchildren upon pension receipt. In table 6 panel C, we report the results estimating the RD coefﬁcient of family size for respondents with
adult sons (i.e., excluding the childless and those who have only daughters). The
results are similar to those in panel A: the coefﬁcients of pension eligibility in
panel C columns (2)–(5) are consistently negative but not signiﬁcant, and columns (6) and (7) show that the results do not have stable negative signs using the
data of 2006. The results in panels B and C show no evidence that pension receipt was associated with signiﬁcant effects on extended family living
arrangements.
Intergenerational Transfers
This paper emphasizes the mechanism that pension income enables elderly pensioners to be less reliant on instrumental support from their adult children, by
for example substituting use of hired or inpatient services. Prior research focuses
on other channels behind the effect of pension income on prime-age household
members’ migration, such as using the pension income to cover migration costs
of adult children or enabling the elderly parents to take care of grandchildren left
behind by their migrating parents. The channel of “staking” the migrant has
been discussed by Ardington, Case, and Hosegood (2009) in the case of South
Africa.19 Duﬂo (2003) also shows in-kind transfers from grandmothers to granddaughters when receiving the pension income. Our simple model discusses the relationship between the two channels. The model is presented in supplemental
appendix S1.
To compare this study with prior research by Ardington, Case, and Hosegood
(2009) in the case of South Africa, we examine whether the pension payment impacts intrahousehold, intergenerational transfers. Our survey asks parents to recall the value of all monetary transfers and service exchange between them and
their adult children and grandchildren in the previous 12 months. To examine
the transfers during the 12-month period after and before pension eligibility, we
redeﬁne the cutoff age as 61. The results are reported in table 7.
Regarding pecuniary transfers, we ﬁnd no effects on transfers to the elderly
from all adult children or on transfers in the opposition direction. It is not surprising that respondents do not transfer more to adult children, given that the
pension income only amounts to around 10% of the average income in the locality. This is also consistent with the interpretation of decreasing instrumental help
19. Note that these mechanisms are consistent with independent living being a normal good (i.e., that
an income windfall would allow greater privacy to each generation, while still providing companionship
and support; see Costa 1997, 1999 and Salcedo, Schoellman, and Tertilt 2012).
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T A B L E 7. Transfers between Elderly Parents and Adult Children
Dependent variable

Local linear
regression
N
(1)

Panel A. Adult children
Range of money transfers from the elderly 1,437
to all adult children
Bandwidth
Range of money transfers to the elderly
1,437
from all adult children
Bandwidth
Panel B. Grandchildren from adult sons’ family
Receive presents or money from the elderly 594
(1¼yes, 0¼no)
Bandwidth
Care by the elderly (1¼yes, 0¼no)
594
Bandwidth

Reduced
form RD
(2)

FRD
(3)

OLS with 2nd-order
polynomial
Reduced
form RD
(4)

FRD
(5)

0.050
(0.385)
6.431
0.343
(0.365)
3.719

0.139
(0.665)
6.689
0.329
(0.767)
3.887

0.287
(0.320)

0.492
(0.525)

0.209
(0.414)

0.323
(0.710)

0.088
(0.150)
3.898
0.007
(0.129)
4.844

0.091
(0.260)
3.950
0.032
(0.241)
4.868

0.113
(0.108)

0.154
(0.196)

0.042
(0.096)

0.093
(0.179)

Source: Data for the study comes from the July 2012 Survey of senior citizens in Laiwu,
Shandong, China. The survey was conducted by Xi’an Jiaotong University, China, and the
Shorenstein Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center at Stanford University.
Note: In panel A, the money transfers received from each child are aggregated to a range: 0 for
no transfer, 1 for below 50 RMB yuan, 2 for 5099RMB yuan, 3 for 100199RMB yuan, 4 for
200499RMB yuan, 5 for 500999RMB yuan, 6 for 10002999RMB yuan, 7 for
30004999RMB yuan, 8 for 50009999RMB yuan, 9 for more than 10000RMB yuan.
Panel A uses the data of adult children from the Laiwu sample. We collect the data of intergenerational transfers by asking about such transfers during the past 12 months in our survey. We aim
to investigate the transfers during the 12 months following pension receipt. Therefore, we deﬁne the
cutoff age as 61 when running the RD modules. In each panel, column (1) is the number of observations; using the nonparametric method, column (2) and column (3) report the reduced form RD estimands and the FRD estimands, respectively. We use local linear regression with the uniform kernel
and choose the bandwidth by the method proposed by Imbens and Lemieux (2008). As robustness
checks, for both columns (4) and (5), we use all observations to ﬁt an OLS regression with 2nd-order polynomials on both sides of the age cutoff. In column (4), the coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of age eligibility is interpreted as the reduced form RD estimand, and in column (5) the
coefﬁcient of the dummy indicator of pension receipt instrumented by age eligibility is interpreted as
the FRD estimand. Panel B uses the sample of grandchildren from adult sons’ family. ***Signiﬁcant
at 1%. **Signiﬁcant at 5%. *Signiﬁcant at 10%.

from children and the elderly parents spending more money on purchased services. The lack of effect of a pension on transfers from children to elderly parents
has multiple aspects. On the one hand, the adult children may earn more income
after migrating, enabling them to send remittances to their parents. On the other
hand, migration costs could exhaust the premium wage they earn, at least for the
ﬁrst months or year. The competing forces render net transfers to parents
undetermined.
To study intergenerational exchange of services (i.e., nonpecuniary transfers),
we estimate the pension effect on a dummy indicator for the respondents providing day-care services to their grandchildren. The RD coefﬁcient is not signiﬁcant.
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On the one hand, upon parental migration, if a child is left behind, then she is
likely to be looked after by grandparents. On the other hand, the child might migrate to live in a new location with their parents, which decreases the likelihood
of receiving care from grandparents.
In sum, in contrast with the case of South Africa, we do not ﬁnd signiﬁcant
transfers between pensioners and other household members. This difference is
not surprising, given that the pension income in rural China is not as sizable as
that in South Africa, which leaves the direction of transfers unclear.
V. C O N C L U S I O N S
Estimating the effect of a novel rural pension program on household outcomes in
rural China, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant impact of the windfall income on the migration
of adult children. The likelihoods of labor-related migration and off-farm employment increased by over twenty percentage points. The magnitude of the estimated pension effects seems particularly striking. The large magnitude could be
because our sample is small and therefore, conﬁdence intervals are large.
However, the magnitude may not be too surprising in this setting: although the
current pension is modest (only about 10% of average income in Laiwu), it represents a large increase in the income of the elderly (who often rely upon support
from their adult children).
The empirical results are consistent with our hypothesis that the monetary
support upon pension eligibility enables other family members to reduce the time
commitment to instrumental support of aging parents or at least to defer those
commitments to when the elderly parent might need them more (in their 70s or
80s).20 These ﬁndings suggest that a market for in-home medical and long-term
care services is likely to develop in rural areas alongside the consolidation and
strengthening of the pension program so that such services will become increasingly available for purchase. An interesting further question for research is how
this service market develops and who participates as suppliers. Labor migration
to fulﬁll the long-term care needs of the urban elderly may ironically constrain
the availability of labor for long-term care in rural areas.
Encouragingly, we do not ﬁnd evidence that adult children signiﬁcantly reduce
transfers to their elderly parents when the parents became pension-eligible, as
some analysts and policymakers had feared might happen. Instead, the public expenditures contribute to multigeneration improvements, with better security for
the elderly and more freedom of occupational choice and urban migration for
the adult children.

20. In a somewhat similar way, Antman (2012) ﬁnds that adult children substitute for their siblings’
time contributions with their own ﬁnancial contributions to support elderly parents.
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